Merge branch 'pr3/spool-delivery' into pr4/install-marker-and-identity

This commit is contained in:
Saket Aryan
2026-09-16 20:35:23 +05:30
9 changed files with 476 additions and 146 deletions
@@ -145,36 +145,49 @@ def _install_salt() -> str:
keys off that file, so recording an event would silently suppress the
install event.
On a read-only or full data directory the fallback is derived from the data
directory path: stable for the machine rather than random per call, so the
failure mode is a weaker salt and not unbounded cardinality in PostHog.
Published atomically, and there is deliberately no derived fallback. Creating
the file with O_CREAT|O_EXCL and then writing into it leaves a window where
the file exists and is empty, and a concurrent hook that reads it in that
window gets nothing. Falling back to a digest of the path would hand that
process a salt an attacker can compute, memoized for its whole run, which is
the privacy control this function exists to provide silently turning itself
off under load. The salt is written to a private temp file first and linked
into place, so the name either does not exist or already has the full value.
Returns "" when it genuinely cannot persist. Callers omit the hash entirely
rather than emit an unsalted one.
"""
global _salt_cache
if _salt_cache:
return _salt_cache
path = _salt_path()
temporary = path.with_name(f"{path.name}.{os.getpid()}.tmp")
try:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
handle = os.open(path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
handle = os.open(temporary, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
with os.fdopen(handle, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
stream.write(uuid.uuid4().hex)
stream.flush()
os.fsync(stream.fileno())
try:
with os.fdopen(handle, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
stream.write(uuid.uuid4().hex)
# Atomic claim: fails if another process already published one.
# os.link rather than replace, which would clobber theirs.
os.link(temporary, path)
except FileExistsError:
pass
except OSError:
pass
finally:
try:
temporary.unlink()
except OSError:
pass
except FileExistsError:
pass
except OSError:
# Cannot persist. Stable-per-machine beats random-per-call.
_salt_cache = hashlib.sha256(str(path).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
return _salt_cache
try:
_salt_cache = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
except OSError:
_salt_cache = ""
if not _salt_cache:
_salt_cache = hashlib.sha256(str(path).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
return _salt_cache
@@ -187,10 +200,17 @@ def _scoped_digest(value: str, length: int = 16) -> str:
privacy control without the salt. Salting per install keeps every
within-account join the analytics actually use and gives up only
cross-machine joins on the same repository, which nothing computes.
Returns "" when there is no salt, so record() omits the property. An
unsalted digest over this input space is close to plaintext, and emitting one
under a name that implies it is hashed is worse than sending nothing.
"""
if not value:
return ""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{_install_salt()}:{value}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:length]
salt = _install_salt()
if not salt:
return ""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{salt}:{value}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:length]
def _safe_value(value: Any) -> Any:
@@ -418,10 +438,17 @@ def record(
os=sys.platform,
python_version=platform.python_version(),
)
# Assigned only when the digest is real. _scoped_digest returns "" when
# the salt could not be persisted, and an empty property is worse than an
# absent one: it survives the None filter below and reads as a value.
if repo is not None:
properties["repo_hash"] = _scoped_digest(getattr(repo, "identity", ""))
repo_hash = _scoped_digest(getattr(repo, "identity", ""))
if repo_hash:
properties["repo_hash"] = repo_hash
if session_id:
properties["session_hash"] = _scoped_digest(session_id)
session_hash = _scoped_digest(session_id)
if session_hash:
properties["session_hash"] = session_hash
line = json.dumps(
{
"event": f"{EVENT_PREFIX}.{event}",
@@ -566,6 +593,14 @@ def _claim_parked(directory: Path) -> Path | None:
age = now - orphan.stat().st_mtime
except OSError:
continue
if age < CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS:
# Someone else holds a live lease on it. This check has to come
# first. Claiming a file bumps its attempt count and refreshes its
# mtime, so a sender that has just taken the final attempt looks
# exhausted to everyone else while it is actively draining. Judging
# exhaustion before liveness let a second sender unlink a batch out
# from under its owner, losing every event in it.
continue
# Attempts, not age. Every re-claim touches the mtime and every release
# backdates it by a fixed amount, so age is pinned near the stale
# threshold and never reaches the expiry. Age stays only as a backstop
@@ -576,9 +611,6 @@ def _claim_parked(directory: Path) -> Path | None:
except OSError:
pass
continue
if age < CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS:
# Someone else holds a live lease on it.
continue
claim = orphan.parent / _claim_name(_claim_attempt(orphan) + 1)
try:
orphan.replace(claim)
@@ -104,6 +104,67 @@ def test_a_fresh_claim_is_not_immediately_stealable(telemetry):
assert telemetry._claim_parked(first.parent) is None
def test_a_live_final_attempt_is_not_deleted_by_another_sender(telemetry):
"""Review finding: exhaustion was judged before liveness, so owners lost batches.
Claiming a parked file bumps its attempt count and refreshes its mtime. Once
the count reaches the budget, the owner draining it looked exhausted to every
other sender, which unlinked the file out from under it. Everything in that
batch was gone, which is precisely the loss this PR exists to stop.
"""
telemetry.record("search", reason="owned-by-the-first-sender")
spool = telemetry._spool_path()
stale = time.time() - (telemetry.CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS + 60)
os.utime(spool, (stale, stale))
claim = telemetry._claim_spool()
assert claim is not None
# Walk it to the final attempt, ageing it each round so it can be re-claimed.
# _claim_spool hands back a0 and _release_claim keeps the name, so it takes
# one full round per attempt to reach the budget.
for _ in range(telemetry.MAX_CLAIM_ATTEMPTS):
# Carry the marker through each rewrite so the final assertion proves the
# events survived, not merely that some file with the right name did.
telemetry._release_claim(claim, [{"event": "code.search", "uuid": "owned-by-the-first-sender"}])
parked = sorted(claim.parent.glob("telemetry-*.sending"))
assert parked, "the batch was dropped while still inside its budget"
os.utime(parked[0], (stale, stale))
claim = telemetry._claim_parked(claim.parent)
assert claim is not None
assert telemetry._claim_attempt(claim) >= telemetry.MAX_CLAIM_ATTEMPTS
assert claim.exists()
# The owner is draining it right now: fresh mtime, live lease.
second_sender = telemetry._claim_parked(claim.parent)
assert second_sender is None, "a second sender took a batch under a live lease"
assert claim.exists(), "a second sender deleted a batch its owner was draining"
assert "owned-by-the-first-sender" in claim.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
def test_an_exhausted_batch_is_still_discarded_once_its_lease_lapses(telemetry):
"""The liveness check must defer the cleanup, not cancel it.
Guards the obvious over-correction: skipping live claims is only safe if an
abandoned one at the same attempt count is still reaped on a later run.
"""
telemetry.record("search")
spool = telemetry._spool_path()
stale = time.time() - (telemetry.CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS + 60)
os.utime(spool, (stale, stale))
claim = telemetry._claim_spool()
assert claim is not None
exhausted = claim.parent / telemetry._claim_name(telemetry.MAX_CLAIM_ATTEMPTS)
claim.replace(exhausted)
os.utime(exhausted, (stale, stale))
assert telemetry._claim_parked(exhausted.parent) is None
assert not exhausted.exists(), "an abandoned exhausted batch was left behind forever"
def test_a_parked_batch_is_drained_behind_the_live_spool(telemetry):
"""Defect 6: parked claims were only reachable when no spool existed.
@@ -145,36 +145,49 @@ def _install_salt() -> str:
keys off that file, so recording an event would silently suppress the
install event.
On a read-only or full data directory the fallback is derived from the data
directory path: stable for the machine rather than random per call, so the
failure mode is a weaker salt and not unbounded cardinality in PostHog.
Published atomically, and there is deliberately no derived fallback. Creating
the file with O_CREAT|O_EXCL and then writing into it leaves a window where
the file exists and is empty, and a concurrent hook that reads it in that
window gets nothing. Falling back to a digest of the path would hand that
process a salt an attacker can compute, memoized for its whole run, which is
the privacy control this function exists to provide silently turning itself
off under load. The salt is written to a private temp file first and linked
into place, so the name either does not exist or already has the full value.
Returns "" when it genuinely cannot persist. Callers omit the hash entirely
rather than emit an unsalted one.
"""
global _salt_cache
if _salt_cache:
return _salt_cache
path = _salt_path()
temporary = path.with_name(f"{path.name}.{os.getpid()}.tmp")
try:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
handle = os.open(path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
handle = os.open(temporary, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
with os.fdopen(handle, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
stream.write(uuid.uuid4().hex)
stream.flush()
os.fsync(stream.fileno())
try:
with os.fdopen(handle, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
stream.write(uuid.uuid4().hex)
# Atomic claim: fails if another process already published one.
# os.link rather than replace, which would clobber theirs.
os.link(temporary, path)
except FileExistsError:
pass
except OSError:
pass
finally:
try:
temporary.unlink()
except OSError:
pass
except FileExistsError:
pass
except OSError:
# Cannot persist. Stable-per-machine beats random-per-call.
_salt_cache = hashlib.sha256(str(path).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
return _salt_cache
try:
_salt_cache = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
except OSError:
_salt_cache = ""
if not _salt_cache:
_salt_cache = hashlib.sha256(str(path).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
return _salt_cache
@@ -187,10 +200,17 @@ def _scoped_digest(value: str, length: int = 16) -> str:
privacy control without the salt. Salting per install keeps every
within-account join the analytics actually use and gives up only
cross-machine joins on the same repository, which nothing computes.
Returns "" when there is no salt, so record() omits the property. An
unsalted digest over this input space is close to plaintext, and emitting one
under a name that implies it is hashed is worse than sending nothing.
"""
if not value:
return ""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{_install_salt()}:{value}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:length]
salt = _install_salt()
if not salt:
return ""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{salt}:{value}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:length]
def _safe_value(value: Any) -> Any:
@@ -418,10 +438,17 @@ def record(
os=sys.platform,
python_version=platform.python_version(),
)
# Assigned only when the digest is real. _scoped_digest returns "" when
# the salt could not be persisted, and an empty property is worse than an
# absent one: it survives the None filter below and reads as a value.
if repo is not None:
properties["repo_hash"] = _scoped_digest(getattr(repo, "identity", ""))
repo_hash = _scoped_digest(getattr(repo, "identity", ""))
if repo_hash:
properties["repo_hash"] = repo_hash
if session_id:
properties["session_hash"] = _scoped_digest(session_id)
session_hash = _scoped_digest(session_id)
if session_hash:
properties["session_hash"] = session_hash
line = json.dumps(
{
"event": f"{EVENT_PREFIX}.{event}",
@@ -566,6 +593,14 @@ def _claim_parked(directory: Path) -> Path | None:
age = now - orphan.stat().st_mtime
except OSError:
continue
if age < CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS:
# Someone else holds a live lease on it. This check has to come
# first. Claiming a file bumps its attempt count and refreshes its
# mtime, so a sender that has just taken the final attempt looks
# exhausted to everyone else while it is actively draining. Judging
# exhaustion before liveness let a second sender unlink a batch out
# from under its owner, losing every event in it.
continue
# Attempts, not age. Every re-claim touches the mtime and every release
# backdates it by a fixed amount, so age is pinned near the stale
# threshold and never reaches the expiry. Age stays only as a backstop
@@ -576,9 +611,6 @@ def _claim_parked(directory: Path) -> Path | None:
except OSError:
pass
continue
if age < CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS:
# Someone else holds a live lease on it.
continue
claim = orphan.parent / _claim_name(_claim_attempt(orphan) + 1)
try:
orphan.replace(claim)
@@ -145,36 +145,49 @@ def _install_salt() -> str:
keys off that file, so recording an event would silently suppress the
install event.
On a read-only or full data directory the fallback is derived from the data
directory path: stable for the machine rather than random per call, so the
failure mode is a weaker salt and not unbounded cardinality in PostHog.
Published atomically, and there is deliberately no derived fallback. Creating
the file with O_CREAT|O_EXCL and then writing into it leaves a window where
the file exists and is empty, and a concurrent hook that reads it in that
window gets nothing. Falling back to a digest of the path would hand that
process a salt an attacker can compute, memoized for its whole run, which is
the privacy control this function exists to provide silently turning itself
off under load. The salt is written to a private temp file first and linked
into place, so the name either does not exist or already has the full value.
Returns "" when it genuinely cannot persist. Callers omit the hash entirely
rather than emit an unsalted one.
"""
global _salt_cache
if _salt_cache:
return _salt_cache
path = _salt_path()
temporary = path.with_name(f"{path.name}.{os.getpid()}.tmp")
try:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
handle = os.open(path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
handle = os.open(temporary, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
with os.fdopen(handle, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
stream.write(uuid.uuid4().hex)
stream.flush()
os.fsync(stream.fileno())
try:
with os.fdopen(handle, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
stream.write(uuid.uuid4().hex)
# Atomic claim: fails if another process already published one.
# os.link rather than replace, which would clobber theirs.
os.link(temporary, path)
except FileExistsError:
pass
except OSError:
pass
finally:
try:
temporary.unlink()
except OSError:
pass
except FileExistsError:
pass
except OSError:
# Cannot persist. Stable-per-machine beats random-per-call.
_salt_cache = hashlib.sha256(str(path).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
return _salt_cache
try:
_salt_cache = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
except OSError:
_salt_cache = ""
if not _salt_cache:
_salt_cache = hashlib.sha256(str(path).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
return _salt_cache
@@ -187,10 +200,17 @@ def _scoped_digest(value: str, length: int = 16) -> str:
privacy control without the salt. Salting per install keeps every
within-account join the analytics actually use and gives up only
cross-machine joins on the same repository, which nothing computes.
Returns "" when there is no salt, so record() omits the property. An
unsalted digest over this input space is close to plaintext, and emitting one
under a name that implies it is hashed is worse than sending nothing.
"""
if not value:
return ""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{_install_salt()}:{value}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:length]
salt = _install_salt()
if not salt:
return ""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{salt}:{value}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:length]
def _safe_value(value: Any) -> Any:
@@ -418,10 +438,17 @@ def record(
os=sys.platform,
python_version=platform.python_version(),
)
# Assigned only when the digest is real. _scoped_digest returns "" when
# the salt could not be persisted, and an empty property is worse than an
# absent one: it survives the None filter below and reads as a value.
if repo is not None:
properties["repo_hash"] = _scoped_digest(getattr(repo, "identity", ""))
repo_hash = _scoped_digest(getattr(repo, "identity", ""))
if repo_hash:
properties["repo_hash"] = repo_hash
if session_id:
properties["session_hash"] = _scoped_digest(session_id)
session_hash = _scoped_digest(session_id)
if session_hash:
properties["session_hash"] = session_hash
line = json.dumps(
{
"event": f"{EVENT_PREFIX}.{event}",
@@ -566,6 +593,14 @@ def _claim_parked(directory: Path) -> Path | None:
age = now - orphan.stat().st_mtime
except OSError:
continue
if age < CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS:
# Someone else holds a live lease on it. This check has to come
# first. Claiming a file bumps its attempt count and refreshes its
# mtime, so a sender that has just taken the final attempt looks
# exhausted to everyone else while it is actively draining. Judging
# exhaustion before liveness let a second sender unlink a batch out
# from under its owner, losing every event in it.
continue
# Attempts, not age. Every re-claim touches the mtime and every release
# backdates it by a fixed amount, so age is pinned near the stale
# threshold and never reaches the expiry. Age stays only as a backstop
@@ -576,9 +611,6 @@ def _claim_parked(directory: Path) -> Path | None:
except OSError:
pass
continue
if age < CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS:
# Someone else holds a live lease on it.
continue
claim = orphan.parent / _claim_name(_claim_attempt(orphan) + 1)
try:
orphan.replace(claim)
@@ -350,14 +350,59 @@ def test_salt_does_not_touch_the_identity_file(isolated_env):
assert not telemetry._identity_path().exists()
def test_salt_is_stable_when_it_cannot_be_persisted(isolated_env, monkeypatch):
"""A read-only data dir must degrade to a weaker salt, not to random-per-call.
def test_no_salt_means_no_hash_rather_than_an_unsalted_one(isolated_env, monkeypatch):
"""A read-only data dir drops the property; it must not emit a weak digest.
Random per call is unbounded cardinality in PostHog, which is worse than no
salt at all.
The previous fallback was a digest of the salt file's own path, which an
attacker can compute, memoized for the whole process. A property named
repo_hash carrying an effectively unsalted digest is worse than no property:
it reads as protected and is not.
"""
telemetry._salt_cache = ""
monkeypatch.setattr(telemetry.os, "open", lambda *a, **k: (_ for _ in ()).throw(OSError("read-only")))
first = telemetry._install_salt()
assert telemetry._install_salt() == ""
assert telemetry._scoped_digest("git@github.com:acme/secret.git") == ""
def test_a_half_written_salt_is_never_visible_to_another_process(isolated_env, monkeypatch):
"""The window this closes: file created, value not yet written.
O_CREAT|O_EXCL then write leaves the name present and empty in between. A
hook reading it there used to get "", fall back to the path digest and cache
that for its whole run, so the same repo hashed two ways depending on timing.
Publishing by link means the name either does not exist or is complete.
"""
telemetry._salt_cache = ""
assert telemetry._install_salt() == first
salt_path = telemetry._salt_path()
observed = []
real_link = telemetry.os.link
def observing_link(source, target):
# Stand where the racing reader stands: after the temp file is written,
# before the real name exists.
observed.append(salt_path.exists())
return real_link(source, target)
monkeypatch.setattr(telemetry.os, "link", observing_link)
salt = telemetry._install_salt()
assert observed == [False], "the salt name existed before it held a value"
assert len(salt) == 32
assert salt_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip() == salt
def test_a_concurrent_writer_does_not_clobber_the_published_salt(isolated_env):
"""Second process to finish must adopt the first one's salt, not replace it.
os.link rather than os.replace is what makes losing the race harmless.
"""
telemetry._salt_cache = ""
first = telemetry._install_salt()
telemetry._salt_cache = ""
second = telemetry._install_salt()
assert second == first
assert not list(telemetry._salt_path().parent.glob("telemetry-salt.*.tmp")), "temp file left behind"
+52 -20
View File
@@ -145,36 +145,49 @@ def _install_salt() -> str:
keys off that file, so recording an event would silently suppress the
install event.
On a read-only or full data directory the fallback is derived from the data
directory path: stable for the machine rather than random per call, so the
failure mode is a weaker salt and not unbounded cardinality in PostHog.
Published atomically, and there is deliberately no derived fallback. Creating
the file with O_CREAT|O_EXCL and then writing into it leaves a window where
the file exists and is empty, and a concurrent hook that reads it in that
window gets nothing. Falling back to a digest of the path would hand that
process a salt an attacker can compute, memoized for its whole run, which is
the privacy control this function exists to provide silently turning itself
off under load. The salt is written to a private temp file first and linked
into place, so the name either does not exist or already has the full value.
Returns "" when it genuinely cannot persist. Callers omit the hash entirely
rather than emit an unsalted one.
"""
global _salt_cache
if _salt_cache:
return _salt_cache
path = _salt_path()
temporary = path.with_name(f"{path.name}.{os.getpid()}.tmp")
try:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
handle = os.open(path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
handle = os.open(temporary, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
with os.fdopen(handle, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
stream.write(uuid.uuid4().hex)
stream.flush()
os.fsync(stream.fileno())
try:
with os.fdopen(handle, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
stream.write(uuid.uuid4().hex)
# Atomic claim: fails if another process already published one.
# os.link rather than replace, which would clobber theirs.
os.link(temporary, path)
except FileExistsError:
pass
except OSError:
pass
finally:
try:
temporary.unlink()
except OSError:
pass
except FileExistsError:
pass
except OSError:
# Cannot persist. Stable-per-machine beats random-per-call.
_salt_cache = hashlib.sha256(str(path).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
return _salt_cache
try:
_salt_cache = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
except OSError:
_salt_cache = ""
if not _salt_cache:
_salt_cache = hashlib.sha256(str(path).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
return _salt_cache
@@ -187,10 +200,17 @@ def _scoped_digest(value: str, length: int = 16) -> str:
privacy control without the salt. Salting per install keeps every
within-account join the analytics actually use and gives up only
cross-machine joins on the same repository, which nothing computes.
Returns "" when there is no salt, so record() omits the property. An
unsalted digest over this input space is close to plaintext, and emitting one
under a name that implies it is hashed is worse than sending nothing.
"""
if not value:
return ""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{_install_salt()}:{value}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:length]
salt = _install_salt()
if not salt:
return ""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{salt}:{value}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:length]
def _safe_value(value: Any) -> Any:
@@ -418,10 +438,17 @@ def record(
os=sys.platform,
python_version=platform.python_version(),
)
# Assigned only when the digest is real. _scoped_digest returns "" when
# the salt could not be persisted, and an empty property is worse than an
# absent one: it survives the None filter below and reads as a value.
if repo is not None:
properties["repo_hash"] = _scoped_digest(getattr(repo, "identity", ""))
repo_hash = _scoped_digest(getattr(repo, "identity", ""))
if repo_hash:
properties["repo_hash"] = repo_hash
if session_id:
properties["session_hash"] = _scoped_digest(session_id)
session_hash = _scoped_digest(session_id)
if session_hash:
properties["session_hash"] = session_hash
line = json.dumps(
{
"event": f"{EVENT_PREFIX}.{event}",
@@ -566,6 +593,14 @@ def _claim_parked(directory: Path) -> Path | None:
age = now - orphan.stat().st_mtime
except OSError:
continue
if age < CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS:
# Someone else holds a live lease on it. This check has to come
# first. Claiming a file bumps its attempt count and refreshes its
# mtime, so a sender that has just taken the final attempt looks
# exhausted to everyone else while it is actively draining. Judging
# exhaustion before liveness let a second sender unlink a batch out
# from under its owner, losing every event in it.
continue
# Attempts, not age. Every re-claim touches the mtime and every release
# backdates it by a fixed amount, so age is pinned near the stale
# threshold and never reaches the expiry. Age stays only as a backstop
@@ -576,9 +611,6 @@ def _claim_parked(directory: Path) -> Path | None:
except OSError:
pass
continue
if age < CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS:
# Someone else holds a live lease on it.
continue
claim = orphan.parent / _claim_name(_claim_attempt(orphan) + 1)
try:
orphan.replace(claim)
+52 -20
View File
@@ -145,36 +145,49 @@ def _install_salt() -> str:
keys off that file, so recording an event would silently suppress the
install event.
On a read-only or full data directory the fallback is derived from the data
directory path: stable for the machine rather than random per call, so the
failure mode is a weaker salt and not unbounded cardinality in PostHog.
Published atomically, and there is deliberately no derived fallback. Creating
the file with O_CREAT|O_EXCL and then writing into it leaves a window where
the file exists and is empty, and a concurrent hook that reads it in that
window gets nothing. Falling back to a digest of the path would hand that
process a salt an attacker can compute, memoized for its whole run, which is
the privacy control this function exists to provide silently turning itself
off under load. The salt is written to a private temp file first and linked
into place, so the name either does not exist or already has the full value.
Returns "" when it genuinely cannot persist. Callers omit the hash entirely
rather than emit an unsalted one.
"""
global _salt_cache
if _salt_cache:
return _salt_cache
path = _salt_path()
temporary = path.with_name(f"{path.name}.{os.getpid()}.tmp")
try:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
handle = os.open(path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
handle = os.open(temporary, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
with os.fdopen(handle, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
stream.write(uuid.uuid4().hex)
stream.flush()
os.fsync(stream.fileno())
try:
with os.fdopen(handle, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
stream.write(uuid.uuid4().hex)
# Atomic claim: fails if another process already published one.
# os.link rather than replace, which would clobber theirs.
os.link(temporary, path)
except FileExistsError:
pass
except OSError:
pass
finally:
try:
temporary.unlink()
except OSError:
pass
except FileExistsError:
pass
except OSError:
# Cannot persist. Stable-per-machine beats random-per-call.
_salt_cache = hashlib.sha256(str(path).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
return _salt_cache
try:
_salt_cache = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
except OSError:
_salt_cache = ""
if not _salt_cache:
_salt_cache = hashlib.sha256(str(path).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
return _salt_cache
@@ -187,10 +200,17 @@ def _scoped_digest(value: str, length: int = 16) -> str:
privacy control without the salt. Salting per install keeps every
within-account join the analytics actually use and gives up only
cross-machine joins on the same repository, which nothing computes.
Returns "" when there is no salt, so record() omits the property. An
unsalted digest over this input space is close to plaintext, and emitting one
under a name that implies it is hashed is worse than sending nothing.
"""
if not value:
return ""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{_install_salt()}:{value}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:length]
salt = _install_salt()
if not salt:
return ""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{salt}:{value}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:length]
def _safe_value(value: Any) -> Any:
@@ -418,10 +438,17 @@ def record(
os=sys.platform,
python_version=platform.python_version(),
)
# Assigned only when the digest is real. _scoped_digest returns "" when
# the salt could not be persisted, and an empty property is worse than an
# absent one: it survives the None filter below and reads as a value.
if repo is not None:
properties["repo_hash"] = _scoped_digest(getattr(repo, "identity", ""))
repo_hash = _scoped_digest(getattr(repo, "identity", ""))
if repo_hash:
properties["repo_hash"] = repo_hash
if session_id:
properties["session_hash"] = _scoped_digest(session_id)
session_hash = _scoped_digest(session_id)
if session_hash:
properties["session_hash"] = session_hash
line = json.dumps(
{
"event": f"{EVENT_PREFIX}.{event}",
@@ -566,6 +593,14 @@ def _claim_parked(directory: Path) -> Path | None:
age = now - orphan.stat().st_mtime
except OSError:
continue
if age < CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS:
# Someone else holds a live lease on it. This check has to come
# first. Claiming a file bumps its attempt count and refreshes its
# mtime, so a sender that has just taken the final attempt looks
# exhausted to everyone else while it is actively draining. Judging
# exhaustion before liveness let a second sender unlink a batch out
# from under its owner, losing every event in it.
continue
# Attempts, not age. Every re-claim touches the mtime and every release
# backdates it by a fixed amount, so age is pinned near the stale
# threshold and never reaches the expiry. Age stays only as a backstop
@@ -576,9 +611,6 @@ def _claim_parked(directory: Path) -> Path | None:
except OSError:
pass
continue
if age < CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS:
# Someone else holds a live lease on it.
continue
claim = orphan.parent / _claim_name(_claim_attempt(orphan) + 1)
try:
orphan.replace(claim)
+52 -20
View File
@@ -145,36 +145,49 @@ def _install_salt() -> str:
keys off that file, so recording an event would silently suppress the
install event.
On a read-only or full data directory the fallback is derived from the data
directory path: stable for the machine rather than random per call, so the
failure mode is a weaker salt and not unbounded cardinality in PostHog.
Published atomically, and there is deliberately no derived fallback. Creating
the file with O_CREAT|O_EXCL and then writing into it leaves a window where
the file exists and is empty, and a concurrent hook that reads it in that
window gets nothing. Falling back to a digest of the path would hand that
process a salt an attacker can compute, memoized for its whole run, which is
the privacy control this function exists to provide silently turning itself
off under load. The salt is written to a private temp file first and linked
into place, so the name either does not exist or already has the full value.
Returns "" when it genuinely cannot persist. Callers omit the hash entirely
rather than emit an unsalted one.
"""
global _salt_cache
if _salt_cache:
return _salt_cache
path = _salt_path()
temporary = path.with_name(f"{path.name}.{os.getpid()}.tmp")
try:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
handle = os.open(path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
handle = os.open(temporary, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
with os.fdopen(handle, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
stream.write(uuid.uuid4().hex)
stream.flush()
os.fsync(stream.fileno())
try:
with os.fdopen(handle, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
stream.write(uuid.uuid4().hex)
# Atomic claim: fails if another process already published one.
# os.link rather than replace, which would clobber theirs.
os.link(temporary, path)
except FileExistsError:
pass
except OSError:
pass
finally:
try:
temporary.unlink()
except OSError:
pass
except FileExistsError:
pass
except OSError:
# Cannot persist. Stable-per-machine beats random-per-call.
_salt_cache = hashlib.sha256(str(path).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
return _salt_cache
try:
_salt_cache = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
except OSError:
_salt_cache = ""
if not _salt_cache:
_salt_cache = hashlib.sha256(str(path).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
return _salt_cache
@@ -187,10 +200,17 @@ def _scoped_digest(value: str, length: int = 16) -> str:
privacy control without the salt. Salting per install keeps every
within-account join the analytics actually use and gives up only
cross-machine joins on the same repository, which nothing computes.
Returns "" when there is no salt, so record() omits the property. An
unsalted digest over this input space is close to plaintext, and emitting one
under a name that implies it is hashed is worse than sending nothing.
"""
if not value:
return ""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{_install_salt()}:{value}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:length]
salt = _install_salt()
if not salt:
return ""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{salt}:{value}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:length]
def _safe_value(value: Any) -> Any:
@@ -418,10 +438,17 @@ def record(
os=sys.platform,
python_version=platform.python_version(),
)
# Assigned only when the digest is real. _scoped_digest returns "" when
# the salt could not be persisted, and an empty property is worse than an
# absent one: it survives the None filter below and reads as a value.
if repo is not None:
properties["repo_hash"] = _scoped_digest(getattr(repo, "identity", ""))
repo_hash = _scoped_digest(getattr(repo, "identity", ""))
if repo_hash:
properties["repo_hash"] = repo_hash
if session_id:
properties["session_hash"] = _scoped_digest(session_id)
session_hash = _scoped_digest(session_id)
if session_hash:
properties["session_hash"] = session_hash
line = json.dumps(
{
"event": f"{EVENT_PREFIX}.{event}",
@@ -566,6 +593,14 @@ def _claim_parked(directory: Path) -> Path | None:
age = now - orphan.stat().st_mtime
except OSError:
continue
if age < CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS:
# Someone else holds a live lease on it. This check has to come
# first. Claiming a file bumps its attempt count and refreshes its
# mtime, so a sender that has just taken the final attempt looks
# exhausted to everyone else while it is actively draining. Judging
# exhaustion before liveness let a second sender unlink a batch out
# from under its owner, losing every event in it.
continue
# Attempts, not age. Every re-claim touches the mtime and every release
# backdates it by a fixed amount, so age is pinned near the stale
# threshold and never reaches the expiry. Age stays only as a backstop
@@ -576,9 +611,6 @@ def _claim_parked(directory: Path) -> Path | None:
except OSError:
pass
continue
if age < CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS:
# Someone else holds a live lease on it.
continue
claim = orphan.parent / _claim_name(_claim_attempt(orphan) + 1)
try:
orphan.replace(claim)
@@ -145,36 +145,49 @@ def _install_salt() -> str:
keys off that file, so recording an event would silently suppress the
install event.
On a read-only or full data directory the fallback is derived from the data
directory path: stable for the machine rather than random per call, so the
failure mode is a weaker salt and not unbounded cardinality in PostHog.
Published atomically, and there is deliberately no derived fallback. Creating
the file with O_CREAT|O_EXCL and then writing into it leaves a window where
the file exists and is empty, and a concurrent hook that reads it in that
window gets nothing. Falling back to a digest of the path would hand that
process a salt an attacker can compute, memoized for its whole run, which is
the privacy control this function exists to provide silently turning itself
off under load. The salt is written to a private temp file first and linked
into place, so the name either does not exist or already has the full value.
Returns "" when it genuinely cannot persist. Callers omit the hash entirely
rather than emit an unsalted one.
"""
global _salt_cache
if _salt_cache:
return _salt_cache
path = _salt_path()
temporary = path.with_name(f"{path.name}.{os.getpid()}.tmp")
try:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
handle = os.open(path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
handle = os.open(temporary, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
with os.fdopen(handle, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
stream.write(uuid.uuid4().hex)
stream.flush()
os.fsync(stream.fileno())
try:
with os.fdopen(handle, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
stream.write(uuid.uuid4().hex)
# Atomic claim: fails if another process already published one.
# os.link rather than replace, which would clobber theirs.
os.link(temporary, path)
except FileExistsError:
pass
except OSError:
pass
finally:
try:
temporary.unlink()
except OSError:
pass
except FileExistsError:
pass
except OSError:
# Cannot persist. Stable-per-machine beats random-per-call.
_salt_cache = hashlib.sha256(str(path).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
return _salt_cache
try:
_salt_cache = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
except OSError:
_salt_cache = ""
if not _salt_cache:
_salt_cache = hashlib.sha256(str(path).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
return _salt_cache
@@ -187,10 +200,17 @@ def _scoped_digest(value: str, length: int = 16) -> str:
privacy control without the salt. Salting per install keeps every
within-account join the analytics actually use and gives up only
cross-machine joins on the same repository, which nothing computes.
Returns "" when there is no salt, so record() omits the property. An
unsalted digest over this input space is close to plaintext, and emitting one
under a name that implies it is hashed is worse than sending nothing.
"""
if not value:
return ""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{_install_salt()}:{value}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:length]
salt = _install_salt()
if not salt:
return ""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{salt}:{value}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:length]
def _safe_value(value: Any) -> Any:
@@ -418,10 +438,17 @@ def record(
os=sys.platform,
python_version=platform.python_version(),
)
# Assigned only when the digest is real. _scoped_digest returns "" when
# the salt could not be persisted, and an empty property is worse than an
# absent one: it survives the None filter below and reads as a value.
if repo is not None:
properties["repo_hash"] = _scoped_digest(getattr(repo, "identity", ""))
repo_hash = _scoped_digest(getattr(repo, "identity", ""))
if repo_hash:
properties["repo_hash"] = repo_hash
if session_id:
properties["session_hash"] = _scoped_digest(session_id)
session_hash = _scoped_digest(session_id)
if session_hash:
properties["session_hash"] = session_hash
line = json.dumps(
{
"event": f"{EVENT_PREFIX}.{event}",
@@ -566,6 +593,14 @@ def _claim_parked(directory: Path) -> Path | None:
age = now - orphan.stat().st_mtime
except OSError:
continue
if age < CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS:
# Someone else holds a live lease on it. This check has to come
# first. Claiming a file bumps its attempt count and refreshes its
# mtime, so a sender that has just taken the final attempt looks
# exhausted to everyone else while it is actively draining. Judging
# exhaustion before liveness let a second sender unlink a batch out
# from under its owner, losing every event in it.
continue
# Attempts, not age. Every re-claim touches the mtime and every release
# backdates it by a fixed amount, so age is pinned near the stale
# threshold and never reaches the expiry. Age stays only as a backstop
@@ -576,9 +611,6 @@ def _claim_parked(directory: Path) -> Path | None:
except OSError:
pass
continue
if age < CLAIM_STALE_SECONDS:
# Someone else holds a live lease on it.
continue
claim = orphan.parent / _claim_name(_claim_attempt(orphan) + 1)
try:
orphan.replace(claim)